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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
In the theoretical literature on ﬁnancial intermediation pioneered by Bryant
(1980) and Diamond and Dybvig (1983), demand deposit contracts’ ability
to provide optimal risk-sharing against consumers’ privatec o n s u m p t i o nc o n -
tingencies at the expense of an illiquid portfolio of assets has been extensively
examined, and alternative contractual arrangements have been discussed.
Among these alternative contractual arrangements o ered byi n t e r m e d i a r i e s
is Jacklin (1987)’s proposal of equity contracts that attain the optimal level
of risk-sharing as a unique equilibrium. That is, ﬁnancial intermediaries that
are entirely ﬁnanced by equity and permit interim trade of equity claims can
also provide consumers with the optimal level of liquidity without the possi-
bility of failure, unlike non-tradable deposit contracts where intermediaries
can default on their debt when runs are triggered. However, the existence
of these free-of-default alternative contractual forms does not justify the
use of deposit contracts in liquidity provision. Therefore,i nt h el i t e r a t u r e
on equity contracts initiated by Jacklin (1987), it is generally argued that
consumption preferences have an important role to play in thee x - a n t ew e l -
fare dominance of demand deposit contracts in the Diamond-Dybvig type
banking frameworks.
This paper examines the equity contracts approach on ﬁnancial interme-
diation and shows that the welfare superiority of the demand deposit over
equity contracts does not necessarily rely on consumers’ preference struc-
ture, but it can also be substantiated in a simple intertemporal banking
environment characterised by uncertainty about consumers’a g g r e g a t ed e -
mand for liquidity. In this framework, aggregate liquidity uncertainty is
introduced by considering that consumers’ preferences are random at the
time period when ﬁnancial contracts are designed. As such, intermediaries
can only make conjectures about the actual realisation of thef u t u r ea g g r e -
gate demand for liquidity from an assumed distribution. In this setup, the
paper examines the di erent characteristics of the two contractual arrange-
ments and discusses the contracts’ optimality by evaluatingt h e i rw e l f a r e
performance.
The seminal paper by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) has provided the
building blocks of recent theoretical models in explaining how demand de-
posit contracts o ered by ﬁnancial intermediaries provide liquidity insurance
to consumers and consequently improve on the competitive outcome. Specif-
ically, in an environment where aggregate demand for liquidity is certain, by
pooling consumers’ endowments, intermediaries can fully diversify away pri-
vately observed consumption shocks, uncorrelated across consumers. Hence,
through the asset transformation function, intermediariesc a na t t a i nt h eo p -
timal risk-sharing allocation and provide risk-averse consumers with the de-
sired liquidity. This liquidity provision, however, leavesi n t e r m e d i a r i e sp r o n e
to runs when an extrinsic factor a ects depositors’ beliefs about the banks’
solvency. Therefore, optimal risk-sharing comes at the costo fa ni l l i q u i d
portfolio of assets which leaves banks prone to default.
In the absence of uncertainty about the economic fundamentals, banks’
1vulnerability to runs has been extensively discussed in the literature, and the
welfare implications of policies that prevent or mitigate the e ects of bank
runs have been widely examined. The most common policies discussed in the
literature that enhance public conﬁdence about the soundness of the frac-
tional reserve banking system and avert liquidity problems include the role
of a central bank acting as a lender of last resort (e.g. Smith (1984), Allen
and Gale (2000)), suspension of demand deposits convertibility schemes (e.g.
Chari and Jagannathan (1988), Chari (1989), Wallace (1990)), and deposit
insurance schemes (e.g. Freeman (1988), Hazlett (1997)). Another strand
of literature has been focused on the design of ‘run-proof’ deposit contracts.
In particular, Green and Lin (2000, 2003) show that a deposit contract can
be designed to implement the ex-ante e cient allocation as a unique equi-
librium when the payo ss p e c i ﬁ e db yt h ec o n t r a c ta r ec o n t i n g ent on deposi-
tors’ reported preferences which are veriﬁable but cannot bef a l s i ﬁ e d .W h e n
depositors are served on a ﬁrst-come ﬁrst-served basis, suchd i s t r i b u t i o n
mechanism of banks’ resources is shown to guarantee truthfulr e v e l a t i o no f
depositors’ individual consumption preferences and the ine cient bank-run
equilibrium never arises. Peck and Shell (2003) also consider a distribution
mechanism such that early withdrawals depend on the withdrawal history
when a sequential service constraint is in place but, unlike Green and Lin
(2000, 2003), depositors queue outside the bank only if they want to with-
draw and cannot observe their position in the line. In this setting, it is
shown that there is a unique equilibrium where bank runs can occur with a
positive probability.
An alternative contractual arrangement to demand deposit contracts in-
troduced by Jacklin (1987) considers the allocations that can be achieved
by a ‘banking ﬁrm’ which issues equity shares rather than debti nr e t u r nf o r
consumers’ endowment (or equity contracts) that can be traded in an ex-
post secondary market. In a Diamond-Dybvig setup where consumers have
corner preferences, Jacklin (1987) shows that tradable equity contracts are
an attractive alternative to deposit contracts as they provide optimal risk-
sharing opportunities to depositors against private consumption shocks and
eliminate the bank run equilibrium. However, when consumersa r ec o n s i d -
ered to have smooth consumption preferences over time, deposit contracts
are the dominant contracts in terms of welfare when incentivec o n s t r a i n t s
are not violated and the optimum risk-sharing equilibrium can be attained.
The assumption of smooth preferences coupled with no aggregate un-
certainty has also been widely adopted in the literature in evaluating the
liquidity risk-sharing performance of these two contractual arrangements. In
particular, introducing uncertainty about the fundamentals in their attempt
to explain bank runs as triggered by interim information thatd e p o s i t o r sr e -
ceive about the impending state of the economy, Jacklin and Bhattacharya
(1988) ﬁnd that deposit contract can be the welfare dominant type of con-
tract. In a similar model, Alonso (1996) reaches the same conclusion even
when banks o er ‘run-proof’ contracts by taking into accountt h ew o r s t
possible realisation of the interim information about the state of the fun-
damentals in the contract design. Haubrich (1988) and Haubrich and King
2(1990) make a distinction between liquidity and income risk where they
demonstrate that the deposit contract’s comparative advantage over an eq-
uity contract is in providing liquidity risk-sharing, whileS u s s m a n( 1 9 9 2 )
argues that government intervention in the secondary marketc a na c h i e v e
the optimal risk-sharing allocation. Departing from the welfare comparison
between the two contractual forms, Gorton and Pennacchi (1990) argue that
deposit contracts provide a mechanism to protect uninformeda g e n t sb e i n g
exploited by coalitions of informed agents about the impending state of the
economy in the secondary market. In equilibrium, they demonstrate that
intermediaries issue both debt and equity contracts where informed agents
select to hold equity and uninformed agents select to hold debt.
Thus, it is evident that the results in the literature on the welfare domi-
nance of deposit contracts rely heavily on the assumed preference structure.
Following Jacklin (1987)’s argument, the ex-ante welfare inferiority of the
equity contracts under smooth preferences is attributed to the restriction in
the design of the contract that consumers have the same wealthp r i o rt ot r a d e
in the secondary market (i.e. the dividend payment). Under smooth prefer-
ences, this results in a loss of expected utility in comparison to tailored-made
incentive compatible allocations under demand deposit contracts, as di er-
ent types of consumers have di erent valuation of consumption in di erent
time periods. However, this distinction between deposit ande q u i t yc o n -
tracts becomes irrelevant in the case of corner preferences where consumers
are assumed to consume only once in their lifetime.
The model developed in this paper is based on Diamond and Dyb-
vig (1983) formulation of ﬁnancial intermediation, and it shows that non-
tradable deposit contracts can be ex ante welfare dominant int h ep r e s e n c e
of aggregate consumption uncertainty and without relying ont h ec o m m o n l y
used smooth preferences assumption. In contrast to the existing literature,
the model demonstrates that when the aggregate demand for liquidity is
not ex ante known, deposit contracts can o er more liquidity insurance to
risk-averse consumers and dominate in terms of welfare even under a more
restrictive preference structure such as corner preferences. In particular, it is
assumed that the fraction of early withdrawers is random so that banks can
only make inferences about the aggregate early withdrawal demand from
an assumed distribution by pooling depositors’ endowment, provided that
incentives are not distorted due to extrinsic factors. In thep r e s e n c eo fu n -
certainty at the time period when contracts are designed, only second-best
allocations can be attained by either contract. Examining the distinguishing
features of the two contracts, the attributes that impose tighter constraints
to the intermediaries’ planning problem are identiﬁed, and conclusions are
made with respect to the welfare performance of the two contractual ar-
rangements. Indeed, it is shown that a common dividend payment un-
der aggregate consumption uncertainty imposes ex-ante tighter constraints
on intermediaries’ planning problem. These constraints cang e n e r a t el a r g e
variations in the market-clearing price for ex-dividend shares, and conse-
quently large variations in the ﬁnal equilibrium consumption allocations. It
is demonstrated that the equity contract is dominated by a deposit contract
3because it o ers less liquidity insurance in the state of the world that is
mostly wanted by risk-averse depositors, and more liquidityi n s u r a n c ew h e n
is least desirable. Following Wallace (1988) and similarly to the existing
literature, depository claims contrary to equity claims, are not tradable so
that ex-post arbitrage opportunities do not arise in the model. Lastly, the
importance of the assumed underlying technology structure in concluding
about the welfare dominance of the two contracts is highlighted.
Although the paper focuses on the welfare analysis of ﬁnancial inter-
mediaries with di erent capital structure, the results can also be extended
to welfare comparison between alternative channels of liquidity provision.
The contractual arrangements considered in the paper can be interpreted as
depository intermediaries that raise capital by issuing non-tradable deposit
contracts such as commercial banks and thrifts, and non-depository interme-
diaries that issue tradable equity claims such as mutual funds. Alternatively,
it can be viewed that liquidity is supplied in the economy indirectly through
depository intermediaries, or directly by trade of shares ofﬁ r m sw i t hap r e -
determined dividend policy and access to the productive investments in the
economy. As such, the results of the paper provide a welfare evaluation
of consumption allocations attainable under di erent conﬁgurations of the
ﬁnancial system of an economy.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the
model and the benchmark case of full information. Section 3 analyses the
optimal form of the demand deposit and equity contracts. The welfare com-
parison of these two contracts is described in section 4, and the conclusion
is presented in section 5.
2T h e M o d e l
The banking environment in this model is similar to Diamond and Dybvig
(1983) framework, where uncertainty about depositors’ early withdrawal
demand is introduced as in Allen and Gale (2005).
Consumers and Preferences:T h e r ei sas i n g l eh o m o g e n e o u sc o m m o d i t y
in the economy that can be used for consumption and investment, and three
dates indexed by t =0 ,1,2. There is a continuum of measure one of ex-
ante identical consumers born at date 0 with an endowment of one unit of
the commodity, and nothing thereafter. Consumers receive a ‘privately ob-
served’ liquidity shock at date 1 and may become either impatient consumers
with probability     (0,1), or patient consumers with probability (1    ).
The liquidity shock a ects consumers’ preference structure. Consumers are
assumed to have corner preferences such that impatient consumers derive
utility only from the consumption of the commodity at date 1, whereas pa-
tient consumers only from consumption at date 2. Expected utility is given
by
V (C1,C 2; )= U(C1)+( 1   )U(C2)( 1 )
where Ct denotes consumption at date t =1 ,2. The utility function U(Ct)
4is twice continuously di erentiable with U  (Ct) < 0 <U  (Ct)a n ds a t i s ﬁ e s
the Inada conditions.
Similar to Allen and Gale (2005), aggregate uncertainty is modelled by
assuming that the preference shock   is a random variable that takes two
possible values 0 <  L <  H < 1w i t hr e s p e c t i v ep r o b a b i l i t i e sq and 1   q.
The distribution of the liquidity shock is common knowledge at date 0 and
uncertainty is resolved after consumption and investment decisions have
been made at date 1. The liquidity shock is independently and identically
distributed across consumers so that, from the law of large numbers,   also
represents the proportion of impatient consumers in the economy. Therefore,
there is ex-ante uncertainty about the aggregate demand for liquidity as the
fraction of consumers who turn out to be either type is random.
Technologies:T h e r e a r e t w o r i s k - f r e e t e c h n o l o g i e sa v a i l a b l et o a l lc o n -
sumers in the economy; a short-term and a long-term technology. The short-
term technology is a one-period storage technology with a return of 1 unit
at date t +1f o re v e r yu n i to ft h ec o m m o d i t yi n v e s t e da td a t et =0 ,1.
The long-term technology is a two-period technology with a certain return
of R>1u n i t sf o re v e r yu n i to ft h ec o m m o d i t yi n v e s t e da td a t e0 . I ft he
long-term productive technology is interrupted at date 1, ity i e l d sar e t u r n
equal to the return of storage.
Intermediation and Contracts:A s a n a l t e r n a t i v e t o t h e i n v e s t m e n t i n
the above technologies, consumers can deposit their endowment in banks
which are assumed to have access to all the technologies described above.
The banking system consists of a large number of identical banks, perfectly
competing on the terms of the contracts o ered to consumers atd a t e0 .
Hence, without loss of generality, the analysis focuses on the contractual
relationship between consumers and a representative ﬁnancial intermediary
that maximises consumers’ expected utility subject to constraints. The rep-
resentative intermediary is assumed to be subject to a sequential service
constraint such that depositors are served on a ﬁrst-come, ﬁrst-served basis.
As such, the intermediary cannot extract any information about consumers’
individual consumption preferences which remains private information, and
the introduction of incentive compatibility constraints isr e q u i r e dt oe n s u r e
truthful revelation of consumers’ preferences. In addition, due to the un-
certainty about   when contracts are designed, the aggregate demand for
liquidity (i.e. early withdrawals) is not veriﬁable, and therefore, contracts
that o er payments at date 1 contingent on the realisation of   are not
enforceable. The representative bank can o er either a menu of demand de-
posit contracts or an equity contract to the consumers at date0i nr e t u r nf o r
their endowment. For each contract, the bank is obliged to payt h ea m o u n t s
speciﬁed in the contract.
Am e n uo fd e m a n dd e p o s i tc o n t r a c t sg i v e st h er i g h tt oc o n s u m e rs to
withdraw either at date 1 or 2. Being unable to distinguish consumers’
individual preferences, the bank designs an incentive-compatible menu of
deposit contracts such that consumers self-select the payment designed for
their consumption proﬁle once the liquidity shock is realised. In addition,
becausetheuncertainty about  is only resolved after early withdrawals have
5been made, the payment designed for impatient consumers is independent of
the state of the world, whereas the payment designed for patient consumers
exhausts bank’s resources at date 2. However, intermediaries that o er
liquidity insurance to risk-averse consumers by issuing debt contracts are
always subject to default when bank runs are triggered due to sunspots as
in Diamond and Dybvig (1983). As the analysis focuses on the exa n t e
welfare performance of deposit contracts in the absence of insolvency, the
possibility of bank runs is ignored.
Alternatively, the representative intermediary can o er ane q u i t yc o n -
tract which gives consumers the right to receive two payments; a dividend
payment  1   (0,1) at date 1, and a liquidating dividend payment of  2 <R
at date 2. A secondary market opens at date 1 that allows trade of the equity
holders’ claims to take place. Having realised their individual consumption
preferences at date 1, consumers have incentives to participate in the mar-
ket as they are entitled to receive an additional payment at the date that
they do not value consumption. Market forces determine the equilibrium
market price which is, therefore, dependent on the prevailing state of the
world. The utility from consumption that consumers obtain from an equity
contract does not only depend on the terms of the contract, buta l s oo nt h e
equilibrium market price in the secondary market, which in turn depends
on the realisation of  .
2.1 Full Information
To facilitate the welfare comparison between the two contractual arrange-
ments under incomplete information, the benchmark full-information case is
examined ﬁrst, where the only friction in the economy is the unobservability
of consumers’ individual consumption preferences. Consider a social planner
that invests consumers’ endowment in the underlying technologies on their
behalf at date 0, and provides consumption allocations that maximise con-
sumers’ expected utility. The social planner (or a representative bank with
full information) is assumed to realise the state of the worlda td a t e1a n d
before any consumer is served. The social planner’s maximisation problem
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subject to the budget constraints:
 SCS
1   XS at t =1
(1    S)CS
2   R(1   XS)+( XS    SCS
1 ) at t =2 ,
(3)
where S = H,L is the state of the world.
The sequential budget constraints indicate that a proportion XS   (0,1)
of the investment in the productive technology is liquidatedi no r d e rt o
6meet the total withdrawal demand at date 1, while the remainder comes to
maturity in the next period and ﬁnances the withdrawal demanda td a t e
2, given the realisation of the state of the world. Provided that the return
from early liquidation of the long-term technology is equal to the return
from storage, the feasibility constraint at date 1 holds withe q u a l i t ya si ti s
optimal to invest consumers’ endowment in the long-term technology and
liquidate a part of this investment in order to meet the demandf o re a r l y
consumption, while keeping the rest invested to ﬁnance the demand for late
consumption at date 2.
Solving the maximisation problem, the ﬁrst-order conditions indicate
that, independently of the state of the world, the ratio of them a r g i n a l





Note that under full-information, the impatient consumers’p a y o   is con-
tingent on the state of the world. Let CS 
1 and CS 
2 be the positive social
optimum (i.e. ﬁrst-best) payo st h a ts a t i s f yt h eb u d g e tc o n straints and the
ﬁrst-order conditions, and XS 
is the social optimum level of liquidation of
the investment in the productive technology, for any S = H,L.
Similar to relevant literature, the coe cient of relative risk aversion is
assumed to be greater than one as risk-averse consumers seek insurance
against the unfortunate event of becoming impatient after the realisation of
the liquidity shock at date 1. This condition guarantees thata n yf e a s i b l e
allocation which transfers consumption from date 2 to date 1 in relation to
the autarkic outcome leads to a Pareto-improvement in welfare. 1
The following relationship characterises the social optimum payo s:2
1 <C H 
1 <C L 
1 for t =1
CH 
2 <C L 
2 <R for t =2 .
(5)
Hence, for a coe cient of relative risk aversion is greater than one, the
relationship between the social optimum payo sa n dt h ea u t a rkic payo s
1In the absence of intermediaries and prohibition of trade between consumers, given the
assumed investment technologies, impatient consumers consume their initial endowment,
whereas patient consumers enjoy the full proceeds of the investment of their endowment
in the productive technology. Although the autarky allocation is a feasible allocation for
the representative bank as it satisﬁes the budget constraints with equality, it does not
necessarily satisfy the ﬁrst-order condition. The direction of movement of the equilibrium
allocations that can Pareto-improve autarky’s outcome depends on consumers’ risk aver-
sion. Indeed, for a coe cient of relative risk aversion greater than one, U
 (1) >R U
 (R)
as CU
 (C)i sd e c r e a s i n gi nC,a n dt h e r e f o r ea n yf e a s i b l ea l l o c a t i o ns u c ht h a t1<C 1 and
C2 <Rcan attain a higher level of depositors’ expected utility.




2 obtained from the
binding sequential feasibility constraints in equation (3), the ﬁrst-order condition in equa-
tion (4) can be expressed in terms of C
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cavity of the utility function. Therefore, for  
H >  









2 from the ﬁrst-order conditions.
7signify an improvement in welfare as risk-averse consumers seek to obtain
liquidity insurance. In addition, from the ﬁrst-order conditions and the
concavity of the utility function it can be shown that 1 <C S 
1 <C S 
2 <R
and consumers self-select the payo  that is designed for their consumption
proﬁle. Finally, note that the relationship between the optimal liquidation
level for each state is XL 
<X H 
as more resources need to be liquidated at
date 1 for a greater number of impatient depositors in order for the optimal
risk-sharing allocation to be attained.3
3I n t e r m e d i a t i o n u n d e r I n c o m p l e t e I n f o r m a t i o n
When the banking system is characterised by incomplete information, the
representative bank can not distinguish depositors’ individual consumption
preferences and, contrary to Allen and Gale (2004, 2005), it does not realise
the state of the world prior to any withdrawals. The objectivef u n c t i o n
of the representative welfare-maximising bank is identicalt ot h eo n ei nt h e
complete information case, but depending on the contractuala r r a n g e m e n ti n
question (i.e. deposit or equity contract), di erent feasibility and incentive
constraints need to be introduced.
3.1 Deposit Contract
Suppose that in return for consumers’ endowment at date 0, theb a n ki so f -
fering a menu of demand deposit contracts which provide consumers with the
right to withdraw a speciﬁed amount of the homogenous commodity at date
1o rd a t e2 .T h em e n uo fd e m a n dd e p o s i tc o n t r a c t sh a st h ef o r m{D1;DS
2 },
where D1 and DS
2 represent the amount of the commodity available to be
withdrawn (and consumed) at date 1 and date 2, respectively. Bank’s in-
ability to determine the state of the world prior to any withdrawals preclude
the contract’s payments at date 1 to be contingent on the realisation of  .
Therefore, the contracts’ payments designed for impatient depositors should
be the same across states. After serving the impatient depositors, the bank
can determine the state of the world, and therefore, the allocation that is
designed for patient depositors is contingent on   and exhausts the resources
of the welfare-maximising intermediary. The bank’s feasibility constraints
have the form:
 SD1 = xS for t =1
(1    S)DS
2 = R
 
1   xS 
for t =2
(6)





2 from the binding sequential feasibility constraints in
equation (3) into the ﬁrst-order condition in equation (4), di erentiation of X
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with re-
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H.
8By committing at date 0 to a ﬁxed payo  at date 1, depending on the
realisation of the state, let xS   [0,1] be the proportion of the investment
in the long-term technology that is liquidated in order to meet the total
demand for early withdrawals, while the rest remains invested until date 2.
Maximisation of depositors’ expected utility given in equation (2) sub-
ject to the budget constraints given in equation (6) yields the ﬁrst-order
condition4
 
q H +( 1  q) L 
U  (D1)




+( 1  q) LU   
DL
2
  = R. (7)
Let D 
1 and DS 
2 be the optimal positive payo so fad e p o s i tc o n t r a c t
which are determined by the feasibility constraints and the above ﬁrst-order
condition.
The following property describes the e ect of q on the equilibrium payo s
and on the optimal value function under a deposit contract.
Property 3.1 D 
1 is strictly decreasing in q,w h e r e a sDH 
2 and DL 
2 are
strictly increasing in q.T h ed e p o s i t o r se x p e c t e du t i l i t yi ss t r i c t l yd e c r e a s i n g
and convex in q.
(Proof: see Appendix)
Note that when the state of the world is known with certainty (i.e. q =0
or q =1 ) ,e q u a t i o n( 7 )b e c o m e si d e n t i c a lt ot h eﬁ r s t - o r d e rc o n d i tion in
the social planner’s case. In relation to the social optimum payo s, the
above property implies that D 
1 > 1a n dDH 
2 <D L 
2 <R .I n p a r t i c u l a r ,
the higher the probability of a large number of impatient depositors, the
lower the optimal payo  at date 1 will be as a greater proportion of the
commodity needs to be liquidated to meet a high demand for liquidity.
From the feasibility constraints, this results into higher payo sf o rp a t i e n t
consumers as the returns from investment in the productive technology are
distributed amongst a smaller number of patient consumers.
In addition, bank’s inability to determine depositors’ individual con-
sumption preference requires the introduction of an incentive compatibility
constraint to ensure that consumers will always truthfully reveal their con-
sumption preferences and has the form
U(D1)   qU(DH
2 )+( 1  q)U(DL
2 ). (8)
Consumers who realise at date 1 that they are impatient, will always
reveal their true type by withdrawing D1 to ﬁnance early consumption.
However, patient consumers have two options; they can eitherw i t h d r a w
D1 at date 1 and store the proceeds for one period, or wait until date 2
4Given that the budget constraints as described in equation (6) hold with equality for a




H.S u b s t i t u t i n gf o r
D1 and D
S
2 into the objective function described in equation (2) and utilising the above
relationship, the objective function can expressed in termso fas i n g l ec h o i c ev a r i a b l e ,s a y
x
H.D i  erentiation with respect to x
H yields the ﬁrst-order condition.
9to withdraw and consume DS
2 .T h u s , t h e a b o v e i n c e n t i v e c o m p a t i b i l i t y
constraint ensures that patient consumers will not misrepresent their type
since the utility that they derive from withdrawing D1 does not exceed the
expected utility they derive from withdrawing the payo  thati sd e s i g n e d
for their type.
Obviously, the above incentive constraint is satisﬁed when D 
1 <D H 
2
but this relationship depends on the functional form of the utility and the
parameters of the model. Without imposing any additional restrictions in
the model, it is shown in the Appendix that the optimal menu of deposit
contracts is incentive compatible as the optimal payo sd on ot violate the
incentive compatibility constraint. However, in order to ensure that the
optimal payo sa r ep o s i t i v e ,t h em o d e l ’ ss p e c i ﬁ c a t i o n sa r eassumed to satisfy
CL 
1 < 1/ H.
3.2 Equity Contract
The banking ﬁrm that o ers an equity contract to consumers at date 0 in
return for their endowment, issues and sells the contract at ap r i c eo f1u n i t
of the homogeneous commodity, raising capital of 1 unit whichi si n v e s t e d
in the underlying technologies. The equity contract has the form { 1, 2}
where payments speciﬁed in the contract are:  1 =   denotes the dividend
payment that consumers receive at date 1, where     (0,1);  2 = R(1    )
denotes the liquidating dividend that consumers receive at date 2. The
representative intermediary selects   to maximise the depositors’ expected
utility from consumption. However, the consumption allocations of the two
types of consumers also depend on the market-clearing price which in turn
depends on the realised state of the world. The intermediary,a n t i c i p a t i n g
the equilibrium market price for each state of the world, selects the dividend
payment to maximise social welfare.
In an attempt to provide a full description of the market forces that de-
termine the attainable allocations under an equity contract, consumers’ in-
centives to trade in the secondary market are examined ﬁrst. After receiving
the dividend payment at date 1, impatient consumers sell their ex-dividend
share in the secondary market at a positive price pS,w h e r e a st h ep a t i e n t
depositors will use their dividend payment to buy  /pS additional shares.
Hence, the consumption allocation of impatient and patient consumers, de-
noted as CS
1E and CS
2E respectively, will be:
CS





R(1    ).
(9)
In determining the market forces that operate in the secondary market,
it is apparent that impatient consumers are always willing tot r a d et h e i r
ex-dividend share since they can obtain additional utility of consumption at
date 1 by selling it at a positive price. Therefore the supply of ex-dividend
shares in the secondary market is perfectly inelastic and equal to the number
of impatient consumers; or QS =  S.O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e d e m a n d f o r
10ex-dividend shares derives from patient consumers who use their dividend
payment to buy additional shares when this provides them withc o n s u m p t i o n
at date 2 at least equal to the consumption that they could otherwise achieve
if they do not participate in the secondary market. Therefore, the demand
for ex-dividend equity is given by
QD =
 
(1    S) /pS for pS   R(1    )
0f o r pS >R (1    ).
That is, patient consumers are willing to buy additional ex-dividend
shares only if the price they have to pay for each share does note x c e e dt h e
return that an ex-dividend share yields at date 2.
Consequently, trade in the secondary market determines the equilibrium
market price and the resulting consumption allocations. Thee q u i l i b r i u m




(1    S) / S for        S
R(1    )f o r   >    S
(10)
where    S =  SR
 SR+(1  S) (so that    L <    H as  L <  H)d e n o t e st h et h r e s h o l d
value of the dividend payment for which the liquidating dividend payment is
equal to the market-clearing price. Thus, the market-clearing price depends
on the dividend payment and on the parameters of the model. When        S,
the market-clearing price is equal to the ratio of the supply of the commod-
ity by patient consumers to the supply of ex-dividend shares by impatient
consumers, and is less than the liquidating dividend. When    S <  ,t h e
market-clearing price reaches its ceiling value and is equalt ot h el i q u i d a t i n g
dividend.
The two possible equilibria that can arise in the secondary market are
represented in Figure 1 where the quantity and price of the ex-dividend
shares traded are measured on the horizontal and vertical axis, respectively.
The supply of shares is perfectly inelastic at  S,w h i l et h ed e m a n di si n i -
tially horizontal at the price for which patient consumers are indi erent to
trade, up to the point where, given the dividend payment chosen by the
intermediary, there are gains from trade and the demand becomes strictly
decreasing and convex thereafter.5 One possible equilibrium in the market is
represented by point A and is referred to Surplus Equilibrium as the cost of
buying additional ex-dividend shares for patient consumersi sl e s st h a nt h e
returns of this investment. Another possible equilibrium isg i v e nb yp o i n t
Ba n di sr e f e r r e dt oNon-Surplus Equilibrium as the cost of this investment
opportunity is equal to its reward.
Substituting for equilibrium price in the secondary market given from
equation (10) into the consumption allocations of the two types of depositors
given by equation (9), the latter will become:














 / S for   <    S




R(1    )/(1    S)f o r   <    S
  + R(1    )f o r        S.
(11)
Anticipating the market equilibrium price pS 
,t h eb a n kc h o o s e sad i v -
idend payment to maximise consumers’ expected utility. Substituting for
the consumption allocations of the two types of consumers into the objec-
tive function, the bank can determine the optimal dividend payment   
and consequently, the resulting equilibrium allocations CS 
1E and CS 
2E.N o t e
also from equation (11) that the relationship of the equilibrium payo sf o r
the two types of consumers in a given state is such that CS 
1E <C S 
2E when
the surplus equilibrium is attained, and CS 
1E = CS 
2E when the non-surplus
equilibrium is attained.6
From these two plausible scenarios that may occur in the secondary
market and the two states of the world, the following lemma indicates that
there are only two di erent regions where the optimal dividend payment
can lie, and therefore there are two possible conﬁgurations of the secondary
market that can arise in equilibrium.
Lemma 3.2 Depending on the parameters of the model, the optimal divi-
dend payment chosen by a welfare maximising intermediary that issues eq-
uity shares will be either such that    <    L,o r   L      <    H.
(Proof: see Appendix)
The ﬁrst conﬁguration is when    <    L which means that the secondary
market is in the surplus equilibrium for both states. The second conﬁgura-
tion is when    L      <    H which implies that the secondary market is in
the surplus equilibrium for the high state, and in the non-surplus equilib-
rium for the low state.7 In the proof of the above lemma it is shown that
consumers’ expected utility is maximised for a dividend payment less than
   H,a n dt h e r e f o r e ,t h ec o n ﬁ g u r a t i o nw h e r et h es e c o n d a r ym a r k e ti si nt h e
non-surplus equilibrium for both states is never optimal.
Substituting the consumption allocations as given in equation (11) into
consumers’ expected utility in equation (2) and maximising with respect to
  yields the following ﬁrst-order condition












+( 1  q)U   
CL 
2E
  = R, (12)
6From equation (11), C
S 
1E is increasing in  ,w h e r e a sC
S 





2E for        S,t h e nf o ra n yl o w e rv a l u eo f  for which the surplus equilibrium is





7Clearly, from the assumption that  
L <  
H,t h ep o s s i b i l i t yt h a tt h em a r k e ti si nt h e
surplus equilibrium for the low state and in the non-surplus equilibrium for the high state
is redundant.
12where CL 
1E <C L 
2E for    <    L,a n dCL 
1E = CL 
2E for    L      <    H.
In the proof of lemma (3.2) in the Appendix, it is shown that there is a
unique   ,a n dt h e r e f o r eau n i q u ec o n s u m p t i o na l l o c a t i o n ,f o re a c hc o nﬁgu-
ration of the secondary market that maximises consumers’ expected utility.
Let CS 
1E and CS 
2E denote the positive payo sf o ri m p a t i e n ta n dp a t i e n tc o n -
sumers for each state respectively, satisfying the above ﬁrst-order condition
and equation (11). Hence, the relationship between the equilibrium payo s
can be summarised as
CH 
1E <C L 
1E   CL 
2E <C H 
2E . (13)
The above relationship indicates that the equity contract o ers more liq-
uidity insurance to risk-averse consumers in the low state ast h ed i s p e r s i o n
between the equilibrium payo sf o rt h et w ot y p e so fc o n s u m e r si sg r e a t e r
in the high state. This is due to the negative e ect of  S on pS 
which
inﬂuences the equilibrium consumption allocations. A high number of im-
patient consumers implies a high quantity of ex-dividend shares supplied in
the secondary market which results in a low equilibrium market price. As a
consequence, the consumption of impatient consumers is reduced since they
are forced to sell their ex-dividend shares at a low price, andt h ec o n s u m p -
tion of patient consumers increases as they can buy a greater number of
shares using their dividend payment to ﬁnance their consumption at date
2. In terms of Figure 1, an increase in the number of impatient consumers
can be represented by a shift of the supply of ex-dividend shares to the right
and a leftward shift of the convex segment of the demand for ex-dividend
shares, resulting into a lower market-clearing price.
Moreover, the following comparative static property of the equilibrium
payo sa n dt h eo p t i m a lv a l u ef u n c t i o nw i t hr e s p e c tt oq provides a greater
insight on the performance of the equity contract in terms of welfare.
Property 3.3 For    <    L, CS 
1E is strictly increasing in q and CS 
2E is
strictly decreasing in q.F o r   L      <    H, CL 
1E becomes strictly decreasing
in q (where CL 
1E = CL 
2E). The depositors’ expected utility at equilibrium is




The above property suggests that the greater the probabilityo fal a r g e
number of impatient consumers, the greater the dividend payment in period
1. A high dividend payment has a positive direct e ect on the equilib-
rium consumption at date 1, and an indirect e ect through the resulting
high demand for ex-dividend shares which puts an upward pressure on the
market-clearing price. Due to the feasibility constraints,t h i sr e s u l t si nl o w e r
payo sa td a t e2f o rb o t hs t a t e s . I na d d i t i o n ,t h eg r e a t e rt h eprobability
that the state will be high, the lower the liquidity insuranceo  ered by the
contract as indicated by equation (13), and therefore the overall expected
utility decreases in q.
13From the above property, a unique threshold value of q exists, namely
  q   (0,1], for which the optimal conﬁguration of the secondary market
changes in the low state. Since   q is the threshold value for which   (  q)=   L,
where    L is independent of q,f r o mt h eﬁ r s t - o r d e rc o n d i t i o ni tf o l l o w st h a t
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(14)
where CL 
1E(   L)=CL 
2E(   L). Note also that   q is positive and less than 1 since
CH 
1E (  dL)   CH 
1 and CH 
2   CH 
2E (  dL).8
Starting from the limit case where the state of the world is known with
certainty to be low (i.e. q =0 )s ot h a tt h es e c o n d a r ym a r k e ti si nt h es u r p l u s
equilibrium (i.e. CS 
1 <C S 
2 ), as q increases it reaches the threshold value
of   q at which the secondary market will be in the non-surplus equilibrium
in the low state. As the optimum dividend payment, and consequently the
date 1 payo s, increase with the probability of the number of impatient con-
sumers being high, the equity contract provides more liquidity insurance in
the high state. However, as the intermediary has to commit to a ﬁxed divi-
dend payment at date 0, this results in more liquidity insurance than what
is socially optimal in the low state. Indeed, when q is su ciently high (i.e.
  q   q), the contract o ers full insurance against the risk of beingi m p a t i e n t
in the low state.
4W e l f a r e E v a l u a t i o n
In each of the maximisation problems that the representativei n t e r m e d i a r y
has to solve in o ering either contract as presented before, the intermediary
maximises the same objective function but subject to di erent constraints.
Therefore, the welfare comparison of the two contracts focuses on the con-
straints that characterise each contract’s optimal payo s in relation to the
benchmark case of full-information. In addition, optimal payo sr e f e rt ot h e
second-best payo sa st h es o c i a lo p t i m u ma l l o c a t i o nc a n n o tbe achieved by
either contract.
Examining the characteristics of the two contracts, it is evident that,
in contrast to the social planner, by o ering a menu of demand deposit
contracts where depositors are served on a ﬁrst-come ﬁrst-served basis fol-
lowing a sequential service constraint, the intermediary realises the state of
the world only after  L depositors have been served in period 1. Therefore,
the level of liquidation of the initial investment in the long-term technology
is contingent on the state of the world. However, since the uncertainty about
  is not resolved prior to early withdrawals, it is not possiblef o rt h ed a t e1
8The relationship between equity contract’s optimal allocation and the social optimum
allocation is discussed in the following Section on the comparison of the two contracts.
14payo  to be contingent on the state of the world. Hence, the deposit con-
tract is constrained in relation to the social planner case too  er the same
payo  to impatient depositors independently of the state. Starting from the
social planner’s budget constraints and imposing equality on the ﬁrst period




.T h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n t h e
optimal payo si st h e r e f o r e
CH 
1 <D  
1 <C L 
1 for t=1
DH 
2 <C H 
2 <C L 
2 <D L 
2 for t=2.
(15)
The deposit contract eliminates the risk that impatient depositors face
due to the uncertainty about the prevailing state, but this risk is borne by
patient depositors as the ﬁxed date 1 payo  results in a higherd i s p e r s i o n
between date 2 payo sr e l a t i v et ot h es o c i a lo p t i m u mp a y o  s. In particular,
when o ering a ﬁxed payment at date 1, if the state turns out to be low, the
lower number of withdrawals in period 1 implies that more resources remain
invested in the productive technology, and therefore, a higher payo  that
patient depositors receive.
On the other hand, when the intermediary o ers an equity contract,
it commits to a ﬁxed dividend payment where the market-clearing price
ﬁnally determines the consumption levels for the two states of the world.
Comparing the budget constraints for the social planner and the bank that
o ers an equity contract, the analogy of the dividend payment   and the
level of liquidation XS become apparent. Clearly, the social planner can
adjust the investment portfolio depending on the realisation of the state,
whereas the intermediary is constrained to o er a ﬁxed dividend payment
and let the market forces determine the equilibrium allocation for each type
of consumer. Starting from the social planner’s budget constraints at date
1a n di m p o s i n gt h er e s t r i c t i o nt h a tt h ea m o u n to ft h el o n g - t e rm investment
liquidated at date 1 is independent of the state yields XL 
       XH 
.
The volatility of the market’s clearing price, however, results in a higher
dispersion between the equilibrium payo si nr e l a t i o nt ot h es o c i a lo p t i m u m
payo s. From the budget constraints for the two periods it follows that
CL 
1 and CH 
2 increase, whereas at the same time CL 
2 and CH 
1 decrease.
Therefore, the relationship between the optimal payo sb e t ween the social
planner case and the equity contract case is
CH 
1E <C H 
1 <C L 
1 <C L 





2E <C L 
2 and CH 
2 <C H 
2E for t=2.
(16)
Evaluating the performance of the two contracts in terms of social wel-
fare, the following result summarises the main ﬁndings.
Proposition 4.1 In a Diamond-Dybvig framework with corner preferences
and aggregate consumption uncertainty, when the utility function and the
model’s parameters are such that the threshold value q    (0,1) exists, stan-
dard demand deposit contracts ex-ante dominate equity contracts in terms of
15welfare for any q  <q  1;o t h e r w i s ed e p o s i tc o n t r a c t sa r ew e l f a r eo p t i m a l
for any q   [0,1].
(Proof: see Appendix)
The proof of the above proposition is based on the properties with respect
to q of consumers’ expected utility at equilibrium under each contract, and
is depicted in Figure 2 where the horizontal and vertical axism e a s u r eq
and consumers’ expected utility, respectively. As both contracts can achieve
the social optimum allocation when the state of the world is known with
certainty (i.e. SOL for q =0a n dSOH for q =1 ) ,a n da r eb o t hs t r i c t l y
decreasing and convex in q,t h ep r o o fo ft h ea b o v es t a t e m e n tf o c u s e so nt h e
comparison of the slope of the optimal value function for eachc o n t r a c t u a l
arrangement at the limit cases where q is known with certainty. It is shown
that the expected utility of the deposit contract EV  
D is steeper than that
of the equity contract EV  
E as q tends to unity. However, the slope of EV  
D
relative to EV  
E as q tends to zero depends on the parameters of the model.
When EV  
D is ﬂatter than EV  
E at q =0 ,t h ed e p o s i tc o n t r a c td o m i n a t e sf o r
any q   [0,1], where EV  
D is represented by the dashed line and EV  
E by the
boldline. When EV  
D is steeper relative to EV  
E,at h r e s h o l dv a l u eq    (0,1)
can be deﬁned, for which EV  
D and EV  
E cross, so that the deposit contract
dominates for q  <q  1, as it is represented by the solid line. In order
to obtain a better understanding of the impact that the model’s parameters
have in determining the dominance of each contract, the standard budget
line-indi erence curve analysis is used to examine how changes in q a ect
consumers’ welfare.
Consider ﬁrstly the case where the surplus equilibrium can bea c h i e v e d
in the secondary market for ex-dividend shares in both statesw h i c hc o r r e -
sponds to the values of the probability of the high state such that q   [0,   q).
The result can be illustrated diagrammatically from the observation that all
the feasible allocations can be described by an intertemporal budget con-
straint. Simplifying for the amount of liquidation (or the dividend payment
in case of the equity contract), all optimal allocations satisfy the following
intertemporal budget constraint
 SCS
1 +( 1   )CS
2 /R   1. (17)
From the characteristics of the two contracts, the restrictions of each
contractual agreement can be expressed in terms of the consumption alloca-
tions. This case is illustrated in Figure 3 where the horizontal axis measures
the consumption in period 1 and the vertical axis measures thec o n s u m p t i o n
in period 2. The budget lines for the two states of the world cross at the
autarky allocation C1 =1a n dC2 = R.T h ec o n c a v i t yo ft h eu t i l i t yf u n c t i o n
and linearity of budget constraints ensures the existence ofau n i q u eo p t i -
mum allocation for each state that maximises depositors’ expected utility.
Note that in order to simplify the diagrammatic analysis, a homothetic util-
ity function is considered such that income expansion paths are represented
16as rays from the origin.9 The social optimum allocations are located on the
crossing points between the two budget lines and the ray from the origin
SO which captures the ﬁxed proportionality of the marginal utilities be-
tween the two types of depositors, across the two di erent states. Similarly,
the income expansion paths for the equity and deposit contract coincide
with the SO for the low state, and for the high state are represented by the
rays EC0 and DC0,r e s p e c t i v e l y ,w h e r eDH 
2 <C H 
2 <C L 
2 <C H 
2E .10
In determining the dominance of each contract at the limit as q tends to
0, from the properties 3.1 and 3.3 it follows that the di erence between the
slope of the expected utility of the two contracts is equal to the di erence
between the expected utility that they attain in the high state. Therefore,
welfare dominance for values of q in the region around zero, depends on
which contract’s allocation lies on a higher indi erence curve in the high
state. Examples provided in the proof of proposition 4.1 in the Appendix
show that both possibilities may arise as this depends on the parameters of
the model and on the functional form of utility. Hence, if the deposit contract
dominates in the region of q around 0, then it remains the dominant contract
for any q   [0,1]. On the other hand, if the equity contract is initially the
dominant one, then the threshold value q  is deﬁned and the equity contract
dominates for any q   [0,q ).
As q increases, the properties of the optimal payo sw i t hr e s p e c tt oq
suggest that the income expansion paths of the equity contract are rotat-
ing downwards whereas the income expansion paths of the deposit contract
rotate upwards. In particular, when q =   q,a na d d i t i o n a lc o n d i t i o ni si n -
troduced in the design of the equity contract as the secondarym a r k e ti si n
the non-surplus equilibrium for the low state and the payo s across the two
periods are equal; i.e. CL 
1E = CL 
2E.I nt e r m so fF i g u r e3 ,t h ei n c o m ee x p a n -
sion path of the equity contract in the low state is the 45 degrees line and
the optimal consumption allocation is now determined by the intersection
of the 45 degrees line with the corresponding budget constraint, represented
by point FL.
For higher values of q such that   q<q  1, the allocation of the equity
contract for the low state does not satisfy the intertemporalb u d g e tc o n -
straint described in equation (17) with equality. Indeed, ith a sb e e ns h o w n
that when the non-surplus equilibrium is attained in the secondary market
for the low state, the common equilibrium payo  for both periods is de-
creasing in q.I nt e r m so fF i g u r e3 ,t h i sc o r r e s p o n d s t oam o v e m e n ta l o n g
the 45 degrees line for higher values of q which leads to inferior allocations
for the low state inside the budget set. Finally, for q =1 ,b o t hc o n t r a c t s
attain the social optimum allocation for the high state as it is illustrated in
Figure 4. The income expansion paths of both contracts coincide with that
of the social optimum at SO,w h e r e a sf o rt h el o ws t a t et h e ya r er e p r e s e n t e d
9This speciﬁcation of the utility function is only for illustrative purposes as the result
of the model hold for any utility function that satisﬁes the standard neoclassical properties
with a coe cient of relative risk aversion greater than one.








2 as  
L <  
H.
17by the 45 degree line and the ray from the origin DC1 for the equity and
the deposit contract respectively, since CL 
2E <C L 
2 <C H 
2 <D L 
2 .T h e
equilibrium allocation of the equity contract lies on the bold segment of the
45 degrees line between points FL and FH.11
The conclusions about welfare dominance are derived from thec h a r a c -
teristics that distinguish these two contracts, as opposed to the contract
that can be o ered under full information. Clearly, their di erence lies in
the constraints that characterise each contract and the restrictions that they
impose on the payo st oa d j u s ti ne a c hs t a t e ,o n c et h eu n c e r t a inty is resolved
at the end of date 1. The representative intermediary being unable to ob-
serve the state of the world when the contracts are o ered at date 0, it loses
ﬂexibility in the design of the contracts in relation to the social planner.
Speciﬁcally, by o ering a demand deposit contract, the bank loses ﬂexi-
bility in terms of the payo  that can be o ered at date 1 as it hast oc o m m i t
to a ﬁxed payo ,i n d e p e n d e n to ft h es t a t eo ft h ew o r l d . H e n c e ,although
holding the impatient depositors payo  constant eliminatest h er i s kr e l a t e d
to the uncertainty about the state of the world in the ﬁrst timep e r i o d ,t h i s
risk is passed to the second time period as it creates greater dispersion be-
tween the date 2 payo si nr e l a t i o nt ot h es o c i a lo p t i m u mp a y o  s. In terms
of the risk of being impatient (or liquidity risk) which can bec a p t u r e db y
the dispersion between the payo sd e s i g n e df o re a c ht y p eo fc onsumer for a
given state, from the relationships described in equation (15) it follows that
the deposit contract o ers more risk-sharing in the high state than what
is socially desirable as DH 
2   D 
1 <C H 
2   CH 
1
12 and less risk-sharing in
the low state as CL 
2   CL 
1 <D L 
2   D 
1.I nt h eg r a p h i c a lr e p r e s e n t a t i o n s
in Figures 3 and 4 for a homothetic utility function, the risk-sharing pro-
vision of the deposit contract is illustrated by the steepness of the income
expansion paths relative to the social optimum income expansion path where
DH 
2 /D 
1 <C H 
2 /CH 
1 and CL 
2 /CL 
1 <D L 
2 /D 
1.
On the other hand, by o ering an equity contract, the bank loses ﬂexi-
bility in terms of the amount of resources that can be liquidated at date 1
(and correspondingly, on the amount of resources that remaini n v e s t e di n
the productive technology), as it has to commit to a ﬁxed dividend payment
at date 0. Depending on the realisation of the state, trade takes place and
the market price for ex-dividend shares adjust to its equilibrium value. As
previously shown in the description of the contract, market forces in the sec-
ondary market create a high dispersion between the resulting equilibrium
consumption allocation in relation to the corresponding social optimum allo-
cation for a given state. In terms of liquidity risk measured as the dispersion
between CS 
2E and CS 
1E,f r o mt h er e l a t i o n s h i p sd e s c r i b e di ne q u a t i o n( 1 6 )i t
11Note that Figure 4 is drawn such that C
H 
2 exceeds the full-insurance payo si nt h e
low state indicated by the point FL.I n c a s ew h e r eC
H 
2 is lower that the full-insurance
payo si nt h el o ws t a t e ,t h ea l l o c a t i o nt h a tt h ee q u i t yc o n t r act can attain in the low










12This relationship holds even when the utility function and the parameters of the model





18follows that the equity contract o ers less risk-sharing in the high state and
more risk-sharing in the low state than the social optimum allocations as
CH 
2   CH 
1 <C H 
2E   CH 
1E and CL 
2   CL 
1 >C L 
2E   CL 
1E.E q u i v a l e n t l y ,i n
Figures 3 and 4, the steepness of equity contract’s income expansion paths
for each state relative to the social optimum expansion path is such that
CH 
2 /CH 
1 <C H 
2E /CH 
1E and CL 
2 /CL 
1 >C L 
2E/CL 
1E.
In the design of the optimal contract that provides liquidityi n s u r a n c et o
risk-averse consumers, it is apparent that committing to a ﬁxed ﬁrst period
payo  is less restrictive than committing to a ﬁxed investment policy when
uncertainty is resolved in period 1. The ex-ante dominance oft h ed e p o s i t
contract relative to equity contract in terms of consumers’ expected utility
arises from the fact that the former o ers more liquidity insurance in the
‘bad state’ of the world (i.e. high state) than the equity contract since
DH 
2   D 
1 <C H 
2   CH 
1 <C H 
2E   CH 
1E ,w h i c hi sm o r ev a l u a b l ee xa n t et o
risk-averse consumers. On the other hand, the equity contract o ers more
liquidity insurance in the ‘good state’ of the world (i.e. lows t a t e )t h a n
the deposit contract since CL 
2E   CL 
1E <C L 
2   CL 
1 <D L 
2   D 
1,w h i c h
is ex-ante less valuable to risk-averse depositors. According to proposition
4.1, this means that as q increases, if the demand deposit is not already the
optimal contract, it becomes the dominant one as the state of the world is
more likely to be high.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper shows that, in an economy characterised by a cornerp r e f e r e n c e ,
when uncertainty about the liquidity shocks is not resolved in the time pe-
riod when contracts are designed, demand deposit contracts can outperform
equity contracts as social welfare is maximised over a less restrictive set of
constraints. Indeed, committing to a ﬁxed dividend payment creates large
ﬂuctuations on the equilibrium market price, which is reﬂected by a high
dispersion of the resulting equilibrium payo sr e l a t i v et osocial optimum
payo s. As a consequence, equity contracts o er less risk-sharing opportu-
nities against consumption contingencies which are privatei n f o r m a t i o nt o
consumers, than deposit contracts that designate incentivec o m p a t i b l ea l -
locations to depositors, depending on the realisation of their consumption
preferences.
The results derived in this model on the ex ante welfare optimality
through the comparison of these two contractual arrangements rely heav-
ily on the assumed structure of the economy’s underlying technology. The
weak dominance of the long-term technology over the storage technology
makes investment decisions at date 0 trivial with regard to the withdrawal
uncertainty at date 1. This is because optimality requires full investment
of bank’s resources in the productive technology, and liquidation at no cost
relative to storage of the required amount in order to honour the promised
liabilities. This, of course, provides ﬂexibility in the design of the demand
deposit contract as the bank can adjust the proportion of the resources it
19liquidates depending on the prevailing state that is realised at date 1. There-
fore, it is clear that when a cost of liquidation is introducedi nt h em o d e l ,
so that liquidation of the productive technology is costly relative to stor-
age, then bank’s investment decisions at date 0 have an important impact
on the resulting equilibrium allocations as it loses ﬂexibility in the design
of the deposit contract. This imposes additional restrictions on the alloca-
tions that are feasible, and consequently erode the dominance of the deposit
over the equity contract. However, the performance of the equity contract
remains una ected by the returns from early liquidation of the productive
technology. This is partly because the intermediary has always to commit
to a ﬁxed dividend payment and also due to the fact that, trade in the
secondary market on the claims that are written on the long-term invest-
ment creates another ‘liquid asset’ between dates 1 and 2, as no premature
liquidation of the physical investment is required. For example, in the ex-
treme case where investment in the productive technology is irreversible, a
depository intermediary is restricted to invest a ﬁxed proportion of its re-
sources in long-term, where at the same time it o ers a ﬁxed ﬁrst period
payo .O b v i o u s l y ,t h i sa d d i t i o n a lr e s t r i c t i o n ,w h i c hi si d entical to the one of
the equity contract o ering a single dividend payment, makesm a x i m i s a t i o n
of consumers’ expected utility to be under a tighter set of constraints and
therefore the equity contract will dominate in terms of welfare.
20Figure 1: Surplus and Non-Surplus Equilibria
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Proof of Incentive Compatibility of Deposit Contract’s payo s
Eliminating the return from early liquidation from the sequential bud-
get constraints given in equation (6), the equilibrium allocations for a menu
of deposit contracts can be expressed in terms of the date 1 payo .A s
such, the objective function given in equation (2), say EVD,a n dt h ei n c e n -
tive constraint in equation (8), say IC,c a nb ee x p r e s s e di nt e r m so fD1.
Di erentiation of EVD(D1)w i t hr e s p e c tt oD1 yields
 EVD(D1)
 D1
=  U  (D1)   R
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where   = q H +( 1  q) L the expected value of  .
To simplify the notation, let  (D1)    EVD(D1)/ D1.I g n o r i n gIC(D1),
let D 
1 the unique payo  at date 1 that maximises consumers’ expectedu t i l -
ity, i.e.  (D 
1)=0 .
Similarly, di erentiation of IC(D1)w i t hr e s p e c tt oD1 yields
 IC(D1)
 D1








+( 1  q)
 L






Note that when the state of the world is known with certainty such that
q =0o rq =1 ,t h ed e p o s i tc o n t r a c ta t t a i n st h es o c i a lo p t i m u ma l l o c a t ion as
 (D1)=0b e c o m e se q u i v a l e n tt ot h es o c i a lp l a n n e r ’ sﬁ r s t - o r d e rc ondition
in equation (4). The social optimum payo sd on o tv i o l a t et h eincentive
constraint as CS 
1 <C S 
2 ,a n dt h e r e f o r e (D 
1)   IC(D 
1) > 0f o rq =0o r
q =1 .
Given the standard properties of the assumed utility function, mono-
tonicity of  (D1)a n dIC(D1)i nt e r m so fD1 guarantees the existence of
a unique value of D1,s a y  D1,s u c ht h a t (  D1)   IC(  D1)=0 . I no r d e r
to prove that the optimal payo so ft h ed e p o s i tc o n t r a c td on o tv i o l a t et h e
IC(D1), it is su cient to show that D 
1 <   D1,o ra l t e r n a t i v e l y (   D1) < 0,
for any q.
Di erentiation of   D1 with respect to q provides
d   D1
dq
=  
  (   D1)/ q    IC(   D1)/ q
  (  D1)/    D1    IC(   D1)/    D1
< 0,
where both the denominator and numerator are negative as
  (   D1)/ q =(  H    L)U (   D1)   R
 
 HU (DH




 IC(   D1)/ q = U(DL
2 )   U(DH
2 ) > 0
23since 0 <D H
2 <D L
2 from  L <  H.
Hence, the derivative of  (  D1)w i t hr e s p e c tt oq will be
d (   D1)
dq
=   (   D1)/ q +   (   D1)/    D1
 
d   D1/dq
 
< 0.
As  (   D1)i sm o n o t o n i ci nq and  (  D1) < 0w h e nq =0o rq =1 ,i t
follows that  (   D1) < 0f o ra n yq   [0,1] and therefore the incentive com-
patibility constraint never binds.
Proof of Property 3.1
Substituting into the ﬁrst-order condition (equation (7)) the equilibrium
allocations of a menu of deposit contracts which are expressed in terms of
D 
1 by eliminating xS from the sequential budget constraints (equation (6)),
di erentiation of D 
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1  H +( 1  q) LU  (DL 
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 .
The denominator is negative from the concavity of the utilityf u n c t i o n ,
while the numerator can be expressed from the ﬁrst-order condition as
 H  L R
q H +( 1  q) L
 
U (DH 




which has a positive sign since DH 
2 <D L 
2 .T h e r e f o r e , dD 
1/dq < 0, and
from the feasibility conditions it follows that dDS 
2 /dq > 0.
According to the Envelope Theorem,t h et o t a le  ect of a change in q to





 EV  
D(V )
 q
= V H 
D   V L 
D ,
where V S 
E denotes consumers’ expected utility in a given state as speciﬁed
in equation (1), and EV  
D(V )=qV H 
D +(1 q)V L 
D the consumers’ expected
utility at date 0.
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24The sign of the above derivative is positive as dD 
1/dq < 0a n dRU (DL 
2 ) <
U (D 
1). The last inequality derives from the relationship betweent h eo p t i -
mal deposit contract’s payo sa n dt h es o c i a lo p t i m u mp a y o  s where D 
1 <
C 
1L and D 
2L >C  
2L,a n dt h e r e f o r eU (D 
1)/U (DL 
2 ) >R(= U (C 
1L)/U (C 
2L)).
As dEV  
D(V )/dq is monotonically increasing in q,i no r d e rt op r o v et h a t
it has a negative sign for any q,i ti ss u  cient to show that dEV  
D(V )/dq is




   
   
q=1
=(  H  L)U(CH 
1 )+(1  H)U(CH 
2 ) (1  L)U
 
R(1    LCH 
1 )
1    L
 
.
Note that EV  
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> 0
where, following similar reasoning, for  L =  H it becomes EV  
D(V )/dq|{q=1, L= H} =
0. Therefore, EV  
D(V )/dq|q=1 is negative for any 0 <  L <  H,a n dc o n -
sequently, EV  
D(V )/dq is negative for any q   [0,1]. Thus, consumers’ ex-
pected utility is strictly decreasing and convex in q when the equilibrium
deposit contract is o ered.
Proof of Lemma 3.2
The proof is based on determining the optimal dividend payment for each
alternative conﬁguration of the secondary market without initially imposing
any restrictions on  .A f t e r i m p o s i n g t h e r e s t r i c t i o n s o n   for which each
case is deﬁned, the region where    lies can be established, and the resulting
equilibrium conﬁguration in the secondary market can be determined.
Substituting for the consumption allocations given in equation (11) into
the objective function for each alternative conﬁguration oft h es e c o n d a r y
market, consumers’ expected utility can be expressed in terms of  .T h ec o n -
cavity of the utility function and linearity of consumption allocations with
respect to   guarantee the existence of a unique dividend payment for each
conﬁguration that maximises consumers’ expected utility. In particular, for
the market conﬁgurations where   <    L (say case A) and    L     <    H
(say case B), the optimal dividend payment in each case is an interior
solution to the maximisation problem. Note also that    L is the unique
tangency point of consumers’ expected utility in these two cases. How-
ever, for    H     (say case C), the dividend payment that maximises con-
sumers’ expected utility given by U (  + R(1    )) is a corner solution since
dU/d  =  (R   1)U  (  + R(1    )) < 0f o ra n y    (0,1). In addition,    H
is the unique tangency point of consumers’ expected utility in cases B and
C. Hence, introducing the constraints on   for which each case is deﬁned,
consumers’ expected utility is never maximised for the conﬁguration where
25the secondary market is in the non-surplus equilibrium for both states. In
contrast, cases A and B constitute possible equilibrium conﬁgurations for
the secondary market depending on the parameters of the modela n dt h e
utility function.
Proof of Property 3.3
For    <    L,t h ee q u i l i b r i u ma l l o c a t i o n sg i v e ni ne q u a t i o n( 1 1 )c a nb e
expressed in terms of CH 




 L CH 
1E ,C H 
2E =
R(1    HCH 
1E )
1    H and CL 
2E =
R(1    HCH 
1E )
1    L .
Substituting for the above payo si nt h eﬁ r s t - o r d e rc o n d i t i on (equation
(12)), the latter can be expressed in terms of CH 
1E .D i  erentiating CH 
1E with
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U (CH 
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2E)
 
qU  (CH 
1E )+( 1  q) H




U  (CH 
2E )
1  H +( 1  q)
U  (CL 
2E)
1  L
  > 0
which is always positive since the denominator is negative from the concavity
of the utility function, and the numerator is positive from the relationship
between the equilibrium payo s( CH 
1E <C L 
1E <C L 
2E <C H 
2E )a n dt h ec o n -
cavity of the utility function. Hence, for    <    L,i tf o l l o w st h a tdCS 
1E/dq > 0
and dCS 
2E/dq < 0f r o mt h ef e a s i b i l i t yc o n s t r a i n t s .
In a similar manner, for    L      <    H,t h ec o n s u m p t i o na l l o c a t i o nf o r
the low state can be written in terms of CH 
1E as
CL 
1E = CL 
2E =  HCH 
1E + R(1    HCH 
1E ),
since    =  HCH 
1E .
Substituting the above payo si nt h eﬁ r s t - o r d e rc o n d i t i o na nd di eren-
tiation of CH 
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1E )+qR2  H
1  H U  (CH 
2E )+( 1  q) H(1   R)2U  (CL 
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> 0
which is positive following similar reasoning as in the case where    <    L.
Hence, dCH 
1E /dq > 0a n ddCH 
2E /dq < 0, whereas dCL 
1E/dq =   H(R  
1)dCH 
1E /dq < 0w h e n   L      <    H.
The above properties of the equilibrium payo sc a nb eu s e dt odeter-
mine the properties of the consumers’ expected utility with respect to q in
equilibrium. From the Envelope Theorem, the comparative static property
of the optimal value function (EV  
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 q
= V H 
E   V L 
E
Di erentiating again with respect to q provides
d2EV  
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which is positive from the relationship between the optimum payo sa n d
the concavity of the utility function as discussed previously in proving that
dCH 
1E /dq > 0.
Since dEV  
E(V )/dq is monotonically increasing in q,e v a l u a t i o na t  q which









1E (   L)) + (1    H)U
 
R(1    HCH 
1E (   L))




1E (   L)+R(1    HCH 
1E (   L))) < 0
which is negative from Jensen’s inequality due to the strict concavity of
the utility function, and therefore, dEV  
E(V )/dq = V H 
E   V L 
E < 0f o r
any q   [0,   q). The consumers’ expected utility in equilibrium is strictly
decreasing and convex when    <    L.






 EV  
E(V )
 q
= V H 
E   UL 
< 0,
where d  =  CH 
1E and therefore
V H 
E  UL 
=  HU(CH 
1E )+(1  H)U
 
R(1    HCH 
1E )
1    H
 
 U( HCH 
1E +R(1  HCH 
1E )) < 0
from Jensen’s inequality due to the concavity of the utility function.
In addition, the second derivative will be
d2EV  
E(V )





1E )   U (CL 
1E)   R
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which, similar to the case where q<  q,i sp o s i t i v ef r o mt h er e l a t i o n s h i p
between the optimum payo sa n dt h ec o n c a v i t yo ft h eu t i l i t yf unction.
Thus, the consumers’ expected utility is strictly decreasing and convex
in q   [0,1] when the equilibrium equity contract is o ered.
Proof of Proposition 4.1
27From properties 3.1 and 3.3, consumers’ expected utility under each con-
tractual arrangement is strictly decreasing and convex in q.H e n c e ,i no r d e r
to conclude about the dominance of each contract, the di erence between
the slopes of the optimal value function with respect to q of the two contracts
is evaluated at q =0a n dq =1 .
Let   
ED = EV  
E(V )   EV  
D(V )b et h ed i  erence between the expected
utility attained under an equity and deposit contract in equilibrium. Di er-









 EV  
D(V )
 q
where for either contract  EV  / q = V H  V L < 0f r o mp r o p e r t i e s3 . 1a n d
3.3.





   
 
q=1
= V L 
D   V L 
E
as both contracts achieve the social optimum in the high state. Note also
that since   q<1, the equity contract attains the non-surplus equilibrium in
the low state.
Speciﬁcally, for q =1t h ee q u i l i b r i u mp a y o  si nt h el o ws t a t ef o rt h e
equity and deposit contracts respectively, will be
CL 
1E(q =1 )= HCH 
1 + R(1    HCH 
1 )s i n c ed  =  HCH 
1 ,
D 
1(q =1 )=CH 
1 and DL 
2 (q =1 )=
R(1    L CH 
1 )
1    L .
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In order to prove that the deposit contract is the welfare dominant con-
tract at q =1 ,p r o v i d e dt h a tc o n s u m e r s ’e x p e c t e du t i l i t yu n d e re a c hc o ntract
is strictly decreasing in q,i ti ss u  cient to show that d ED/dq|q=1 > 0.
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+  H(R   1)U ( CH 
1 + R(1    HCH 
1 )) > 0.
As the autarky payo  of CH 
1 =1i st h em i n i m u mv a l u et h a tCH 
1 can
take, evaluation of d ED/dq|q=1 at CH 
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 H + R(1    H)
 
.
Given that   q<1, the following condition on the model’s parameters
should hold for the equity contract to be in the non-surplus equilibrium
 HCH 
1 + R(1    HCH 
1 )  
R





 LR +1   L.
For CH 
1 =1 ,t h ea b o v ec o n d i t i o nc a nb ee x p r e s s e di nt e r m so fR as
R    H(1    L)/
 
 L(1    H)
 
.L e t  R be the value of R for which the
condition holds with equality. As d ED/dq|{q=1,CH 












=( 1   L)U (R) (1  H)U   
 H + R(1    H)
 
< 0,
evaluation of d ED/dq|{q=1,CH 
1 =1} at   R yields
d ED
dq
   
   
{q=1,CH 
1 =1,   R}
=  LU(1) + (1    L)U(  R)   U( H/ L).
In order for the autarky allocation to be the social optimum alloca-
tion in the high state, from the ﬁrst-order condition in the social plan-
ner’s problem given in equation (4), the coe cient of relative risk aversion
should be equal to one. In this case, the utility function takes the loga-




1 =1,  R}
 
/  L =  log(  R) < 0. In addition, when eval-
uated at the maximum value that  L can take (i.e.  L =  H)i ti se q u a lt o
zero. Therefore, as  L <  H, d ED/dq|{q=1,CH 
1 =1,   R} > 0f o ra n yR when
the secondary market is in the non-surplus equilibrium, and consequently,
d ED/dq|q=1 > 0f o ra n yCH 
1 > 1. Hence, as q approaches 1, the expected
utility that consumers derive from the deposit contract is greater than that
of the equity contract as illustrated in Figure 2.
Similarly, evaluating the di erence between the slopes of the expected
utilities at q =0y i e l d s
d ED
dq
   
   
q=0
= V H 
E   V H 
D
since both contracts achieve the social optimum for the low state. Substi-
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Given that consumers’ expected utility under each contract is strictly
decreasing in q,f o rt h ed e p o s i tc o n t r a c tt ob et h ew e l f a r ed o m i n a n to n ei n
the region around q =0r e q u i r e sd ED/dq|q=0 < 0. However, no positive
conclusions can be drawn about the sign of the above expression as this
depends on the parameters of the model and the functional formo ft h e
utility. In particular, for the constant relative risk aversion utility function
of the form U(C)=C1  /(1  ), where   > 1t h ec o e  cient of relative risk
aversion, algebraic examples can be provided where the aboved i  erence can
take both positive and negative signs.
From the ﬁrst-order condition of the social planner and the intertemporal








.S u p p o s e f o r e x a m p l e t h a t   =2 , H =
0.7a n d L =0 .4. For R =3 .5, d ED/dq|q=0   0.46, or alternatively
V H 
E >VH 
D .I nt e r m so fF i g u r e2a n dg i v e nt h a tb o t hEV  
E(V )a n dEV  
D(V )
are decreasing in q,t h i si m p l i e st h a tEV  
E(V )i sﬂ a t t e rt h a nEV  
D(V )a t
q =0a n dt h e r e f o r et h ee q u i t yc o n t r a c ti n i t i a l l yd o m i n a t e sa n dt h et h r e s h o l d
value of q    (0,1) can be deﬁned where EV  
D(V )i sr e p r e s e n t e db yt h e
solid line. In terms of Figure 3, this implies that the allocation of the
equity contract in the high state lies on a higher indi erencec u r v et h a n
the allocation of the deposit contract as V H 
E >V H 
D .O n t h e c o n t r a r y ,
for R =2 ,d ED/dq|q=0    0.22, or V H 
E <V H 
D .H e n c e , EV  
E(V )i s
steeper than EV  
D(V )a tq =0i nF i g u r e2a n dt h e r e f o r et h ed e p o s i tc o n t r a c t
dominates, where EV  
D(V )i sr e p r e s e n t e db yt h ed a s h e dl i n e . I nt h i sc a s e ,
the equity contract’s allocation lies on a lower indi erencec u r v ei nF i g u r e
3.
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